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Chequers	produces	the	best	and	most	elaborate
fudge	available
Does	the	text	the	cabinet	agreed	at	Chequers	amount	to	a	soft	Brexit	or	a	soft-ish	Brexit?	Neither,
says	Jim	Gallagher	(Centre	on	Constitutional	Change):	it	is	yet	another	fudge	that	defers	a
decision	on	the	final	shape	of	the	deal	into	the	transitional	period,	and	beyond.
	
“What	I	tell	you	three	times	is	true”
Lewis	Carroll
After	a	long	day	at	Chequers,	Theresa	May’s	European	approach	remained	on	what	might	charitably	called	its
course.	Brexiteers	in	Cabinet	came	quietly,	it	seemed,	and	signed	up	for	an	elaborate	plan	for	a	soft-ish	Brexit.
So	was	everything	settled?
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Hardly.	As	I	have	argued	in	this	blog	twice	before,	May’s	only	objectives	are	to	leave	the	EU	next	spring,	and	not
destroy	the	Conservative	party	in	the	process.	Nothing	else	matters.	That	is	what	we	have	seen	this	weekend.	The
policy	problem	was	postponed,	not	dealt	with,	and	for	two	whole	days	a	fatal	Cabinet	split	was	avoided.	Now	that
David	Davis	has	finally	resigned,	over	the	‘softness’	of	the	proposed	Brexit,	Tory	party	divisions	are	all	the	more
evident	–	but	they	may	not	be	enough	to	topple	May.
In	part,	this	is	because	the	government’s	plan	for	a	post-Brexit	trade	relationship	with	the	EU	is	not	so	much	soft	but,
as	predicted,	a	fudge.	To	be	fair,	it	is	the	best	and	most	elaborate	fudge	that	ingenious	official	minds	could	devise.
Staying	in	the	single	market	for	goods	arguably	avoids	the	need	for	physical	border	checks	on	trade	for	compliance
reasons,	helpful	in	the	Irish	context.	The	customs	plan,	however,	is	simply	a	combination	of	the	two	previous	plans
(max-fac,	a	cosmetic	for	a	hard	border,	and	a	customs	partnership,	already	rejected	by	the	EU).
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The	question	is	not	whether	the	EU	will	accept	or	reject	these	plans.	Of	course	it	will	reject	them.	The	question	is
whether	the	EU	will	engage	in	discussion	about	a	future	trade	relationship,	even	knowing	what	these	plans	are.	It	is
that	discussion	which	will	get	May	and	her	party	over	the	line	of	leaving	the	EU	next	spring.	That	depends	on	other
parts	of	the	plan.	First,	the	backstop	–	what	happens	in	the	absence	of	agreement.	The	government	apparently
accepts	that	there	will	be	a	legally	enforceable	backstop,	certainly	for	Ireland,	and	(in	the	absence	of	the	border
across	the	Irish	Sea)	applying	to	Great	Britain	too.	Second,	the	transition.	Here	May	has	not	done	so	well,	and	has
accepted	the	transition	will	end	in	2020;	she	might	yet	come	back	to	that,	or	may	simply	rest	on	the	backstop	of
continuing	membership	of	both	the	single	market	and	customs	union.
What	will	an	exasperated	EU	make	of	these	plans?	Logically,	they	might	conclude	that	since	Britain	is	looking	for	a
status	which	does	not	exist	–	neither	a	third	country	nor	a	member	of	the	EU,	or	even	EEA	or	EFTA	–	there	is	little
point	in	negotiating.	Let	a	hard	Brexit	happen,	and	then	deal	with	the	UK	as	a	non-member	hoping	to	establish	a	new
relationship.	The	economic	and	political	consequences	for	the	UK	would	the	seismic.	The	government’s	European
policy	would	have	failed	disastrously,	and	there	would	be	pressure	for	an	immediate	general	election.	A	party	which
wants	to	be	sure	of	winning	that	election	would	offer	a	“people’s	vote”,	most	likely	with	the	choice	hard	Brexit	or	no
Brexit.
But	although	it	might	be	tempting	to	Michel	Barnier,	he	is	unlikely,	as	I’ve	argued	before,	to	take	that	route.	His	initial
response	to	the	government’s	announcement	was	emollient:	he	would	study	the	white	paper	against	the	EU’s
objectives.	So	long	as	the	transitional	period	means	no	change	in	customs	and	regulation,	and	the	backstop	for
Ireland	guarantees	that	at	least	it	remains	inside	the	single	market	and	the	customs	union	–	with	the	more	or	less
explicit	acknowledgement	that	it	will	drag	the	rest	of	the	UK	with	it	–	why	should	he	bring	forward	a	hard	Brexit	to
2019?	Disruption	and	the	loss	of	UK	EU	contributions	are	not	in	his	interest.
And	the	chances	are	he	will	not	be	holding	this	dossier	in	Brussels	when	the	problem	comes	to	a	head	again	later
on.
So	down	the	road	the	can	will	be	kicked.	The	UK	will	still	be	arguing	about	Europe,	and	little	else,	in	2020	and
beyond.	Avid	Brexiteers	in	the	Cabinet	are	telling	themselves	that	once	the	UK	has	left,	they	can	argue	for	or
engineer	are	hard	Brexit;	middle-of-the-road	ministers	hope	that	immediate	economic	disruption	can	be	avoided,	and
sensible	long-term	arrangements	emerge.	Both	are	presumably	relieved	that	May	is	not	Sir	Robert	Peel,	who
decided	over	the	corn	laws	that	the	national	interest	mattered	more	than	keeping	the	Conservative	party	together.
The	rest	of	us	might	not	share	that	relief.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Jim	Gallagher	is	Visiting	Professor	of	Government	at	Glasgow	University	and	an	Associate	Member	at	Nuffield
College,	Oxford.	
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